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Culture, Liberty and Happiness 
Karma Ura∗ 
Introduction and Key Concepts 
In today's heightened and perplexing intercultural world, both 
really and virtually, culture should become an important 
issue. Apart from anthropologists and traditionalists, culture 
has had a marginal role in development thinking. Nor is 
culture, it seems, given such importance in the international 
political and economic order. An analysis of cultural liberty 
has to be seen within the context of global problems to which 
the analysis is addressed implicitly. As I perceive, the three 
dominant global problems are: inequality of income, 
environmental deterioration, and conflicts not only between 
human beings but human beings and other life. Promotion of 
cultural liberty around the world is particularly meant to 
promote democracy and human rights, and through them 
peace and development. Conflict usually means violence. 
Absence of conflict (understood as violence) does not mean 
collective happiness, which is also a self-evident value and for 
which much more positive conditions are needed to be felt. 
The Bhutanese government’s agenda has attempted to 
encompass the global problems mentioned above locally 
within Gross National Happiness. There is the beginning of a 
search for gross or collective national happiness, it being 
understood that happiness can become elusive while 
individuals become perfectly ‘better off’ through 
modernization. The challenge is how to transcend various 
problems of material poverty while simultaneously creating 
conditions for happiness.  
My intention here is to explore mainly the relationship 
between culture and globalization, and also to a limited 
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extent the ties and differences, if any, between cultural liberty 
and happiness. This paper attempts to relate the concept of 
cultural liberty to the idea of Gross National Happiness in-
the-making. However, I would like to underline strongly that 
the culture discussed is not about the particular culture of 
Bhutan; it is about culture in general and in abstract. 
Likewise happiness referred to here is not about happiness in 
Bhutan, although Bhutan’s Gross National  
Happiness provides the frame for seeking solutions for some 
of the contemporary problems, not only in Bhutan but also 
elsewhere in the world. The perspective of Gross National 
Happiness, however skeletal its concepts may be, is used in 
this essay to view and analyse contemporary problems 
beyond Bhutan. Thus, I need to point out clearly that the 
essay is not about implications of Bhutanese culture on 
Bhutanese happiness or vice versa. 
But an essay tracing the relationship between culture, 
globalisation, cultural liberty and happiness is easier if there 
are clear conceptions of both cultural liberty and Gross 
National Happiness (hence abbreviated to GNH). This is not 
the case. GNH is in a conceptually formative stage, and is 
open to different conceptualisations and interpretations, and 
even contestations. Within Bhutan, GNH has been variously 
perceived: as statist narrative of policy evolution that provides 
a narrative frame; as a legitimation of policy bundle at any 
given moment to suggest that the current policies subsumes 
GNH without any need to explain what it is independently of 
policies at a given time; as a normatively defined goal for the 
country towards which its sub-units should navigate and 
gravitate; as a self-representation or identity of the state in 
comparision to the ‘imagined or real outsider-audience’ when 
its bureaucratic class who explicates it confronts them, really 
or imaginarily; as a search for extension and application of 
Buddhist ontology to development practice and to 
contemporary governance.  
Among anthropologists, culture as a concept is contested 
and that means the content of what is viewed as a particular 
culture will vary over time and place, and by individuals. 
Thus, both the topics I want to relate, Gross National 
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Happiness and culture, have far less shape and form than 
favourable to my attempt to relate them. I mentioned about 
the formative stage in which gross national happiness is, but 
the definition of culture seems no less certain. Wright 
(1998:8) mentions that “by mid-century, Krober and 
Kluckholm had found 164 definitions in their famous review 
of what anthropologists meant by culture” (1952: 149). 
Invoking current meanings of culture as a set of meanings 
and ideas, Wright says that: “’culture’ is a dynamic concept, 
always negotiable, and in process of endorsement, 
contestations and transformation. In a process of claiming 
power and authority, all are trying to assert different 
definitions which will have different material outcomes” 
(Wright 1998:8-10). This new concept of culture1 rejects any 
culture as being unchanging, authoritative, and bounded. It 
does not accept, contrary to the old concept of culture, that 
there are timeless consensus meanings in a society. Rather, 
the new concept of culture suggests that meaning is produced 
by opposing discourses mounted by different groups. It leaves 
open the idea that the shifts in the meaning of key terms 
occur. Of course, everything is a matter of definition and who 
and how something is defined is itself a historically 
contingent matter in social science. Defining culture is often 
an act of politics and politics is about shaping meaning in a 
society. Hershock (forthcoming book: Chapter 5:9) has 
suggested that politics is not only about managing 
                                              
 
1 Susan Wright writes that “In sum the characteristics of new ideas of 
culture are: ‘culture is an active process of meaning making and contestation 
over definition, including of itself’ (Street 1993:2) people, differently 
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historically specific, and ideas never form a closed or coherent whole in his 
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object, beyond human agency, not ideological – like the old idea of culture” 
(Wright 1998: 10). 
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asymmetries of power but that it is ultimately about making 
meaning within such asymmetries.2  
With the foregoing discussion, three key terms—culture, 
liberty and diversity—can be now tentatively defined. A 
culture according to current definition is a loose set of ideas 
and meanings (and their material expressions) that are 
subject to change because of contest between opposing 
discourses. Individual liberty can be understood in the 
standard liberalist way as mere absence of ‘illegal or 
unconstitutional’ coercion while making any choice. The term 
diversity can be best understood as it is done in ecological 
terms. “Diversity measures the resilience of a self-sustaining 
ecosystem” (Hershock, forcoming book. Ch. 5). When this 
concept is applied to cultural diversity, it can be understood 
as the extent of “interdependencies by means of which 
individual members contribute to each other's welfare” 
(Hershock, forcoming book. Ch. 5), materially, emotionally, 
and spiritually. If we push this notion of diversity further, it 
seems that diversity is indeed necessary for us as individuals 
to contribute and be contributed to. When there is no 
diversity, there will be no space to contribute in any 
meaningful way to each other. And it is only through the 
meaningful diversity and interdependence, “not mere co-
existence”, as Hershock writes, that we can increase our 
welfare, which is always a relational matter. 
Cultural liberty, which needs to be distinguished from 
culture, although both culture and cultural liberty are 
interrelated, is far more explicit and explicated. The UNDP 
devoted its admirable annual, 2004 Human Development 
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in the sense that it is exerted in order to frame (if not determine) situation in 
meaning. This, indeed, is why politics is so often an intensely emotional: it 
involves arriving at substantially and effectively shared public emotions. To 
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Report to the issue of cultural liberty.3 Human Development 
Report 2004 is a valuable navigational tool both in theory and 
practice with regard to cultural issues. In terms of ethnic 
conflicts and identity-based politics that have been the site of 
conflict and confrontation within and between nations, the 
report sharpens our focus on a global problem. In the last 59 
years of its existence, the UN has had to respond to ethnic 
conflicts through various ways including mediation, 
negotiation, sanctions, and peace enforcement (Carment and 
James, 1998). As ethnic diversity rises within a state due to 
the inflow of culturally different groups, the tasks of conflict 
prevention, reduction, and resolution with immigrant groups 
with other particularistic traits have become vital. The HDR 
2004 enhances our knowledge about cultural issues and its 
analysis and prescriptions provide broad basis for 
individuals, institutions, and states to design solutions. I 
greatly admire with the general ethos of the report. It 
advances global vision and suggests new frames of state and 
governance. It does not privilege any culture or polity above 
the other, against a world which is often hierarchically 
structured. It has no special targets; nations where cultural 
liberty is upset or flourishing are mentioned as far as 
evidences are collected. Its only universalising project is 
human development by strengthening liberty and choice of 
the individual, not even the group or collectivity that is 
constituted by a culture.  
The principle message underlying cultural liberty and 
that of the HDR 2004 is that the best way for peace between 
and within culturally different societies lies in promoting 
                                              
 
3 UNDP, ‘Human Development Report 2004 Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse 
World’. UNDP (2004) pp.285, is the most comprehensive document to 
appear on the subject. Its non-technical language makes broad audience 
possible. Its magisterial survey of evidences takes the readers to all the 
corners of the globe where cultural signposts (indicators) of tight spots and 
good-practices are flagged. The reports explodes so-called myths fuelling 
tensions, mistrust and conflicts over cultures, and it frames challenges and 
remedies. 
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cultural liberty. An articulation of cultural diversity as a 
possible outcome of liberty, as well as liberty as a 
precondition of any society, projects a future of meaningful 
global diversity. This view of the world, for example that 
which HDR 2004 paints, opens more space in all directions—
politics, economy, law, religion, etc., by not privileging or 
enforcing one priority value, or one system, over another as 
long as individual liberty is respected in any society. Such an 
ethos of cultural liberty can lead to a better, alternative kind 
of relations between and within states.  
Self, Identities, and Happiness 
As I understand, the HDR 2004 powerfully reinforces the 
picture of an individual as the choice-maker that is part of 
political liberalism and value pluralism.4 A belief in value 
pluralism implies that there are many types of moral reasons 
or sources of morality and that the heterogeneity of moral 
sources means that there cannot be an all encompassing 
value or a single good or value that can override all other 
values or goods in all circumstances.5 The breadth of the 
                                              
 
4 Galston (1999:770) succinctly summarised the basic features of value 
pluralism by the following: Firstly, statements of value pluralism are claims 
about the structure of our moral universe or “objective structures of the 
valuational universe”. Secondly, value pluralism is different from relativism 
given that value pluralism, in contrast to relativism, believes or defines a 
minimum condition that must be met in any society in order to allow for 
moral decency. Thirdly, above the minimum conditions that must be 
adhered in all societies, value pluralism recognises that there are 
heterogenous “moral and non-moral goods”. Fourthly, such goods or values 
cannot be ranked and ordered across individuals and societies who are 
different. Fifthly and finally, value pluralism says that “a single good or 
value, or set of values or goods” is paramount in all circumstances. So it 
rejects this single dominant value for all circumstances. 
5 Galston (1999) specifies at least five competing values or moral claims. 
These are (1) particularistic duties, (2) aggregate consequences, (3) universal 
(deontological) rules of conduct, (4) perfectionist-achievement values and 
(5) commitments to personal understandings. He attributes the first three 
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choice is to be limited only by respect for human rights of 
others. If an individual’s choice leads him to abutting or 
knocking against the walls of social, political, and cultural 
constraints of a group, the walls are to be removed, not the 
individual. The balance that has to be negotiated in the 
relationship between the group and the individual is the core 
of the report’s subject, although how an individual has to 
negotiate through the maze of changing and conflicting 
identities within himself receives far less focus. 
The Human Development Report 2004 reminds us about 
the multiple identities of an individual and defends cultural 
liberty and multiple identities. The acknowledgement of 
multifaceted, multiple identities could lead to a lesser urge to 
construct imagined cultural boundaries around ourselves. 
Our plural identities cannot be understated for peacefully 
coexistent but diverse social and political orders. Reading the 
report provokes an imagination of our world reversing the 
accelerating path to sameness and diminishment of 
meaningful diversity, while the methods to this goal of 
meaningful diversity has to adhere to respecting individuals 
within any society. The concept of multiple identities of an 
individual is in fact somewhat new in the discourse of 
culture. Sokefeld (1999) has drawn our attention to the fact 
that if our identities are plural or multiple, we need to have a 
conception of self as a kind of manager of these identities.6 
                                                                                                 
 
claims to Larmore (1987,1991,1996) and the last two moral claims to Thomas 
Nagel (1979). At the same time, Galston reminds us that there may be 
conflicts in alternative choices within the same value. 
6 Sokefield mentions that western anthropologists have worked on the 
assumption of there being a self among themselves in a Cartesian self. Such 
selves were considered: “subjects in the dual sense of being subjected to the 
conditions of the world and, simultaneously, being the agent of knowing 
and doing in that world. The belief in this subject became a priori for the 
possibility of knowing the world” (Sokefeld 1999: 417). But he mentions that 
the non-westerns subjects of anthropologists were considered not to have 
self, but only identities as sameness over time. This was because Western 
anthropologists subsumed non-westerners “under groups to which they 
belong”. In the extreme case, this lead to the conclusion that non-westerners 
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But others (Fuchs in response to Sokefeld, 1999: 433-434) 
suggest that the self is constituted by identities. 
The conceptualization of multiple identities and 
complementary identities is a signficant contribution that 
emphasises continuity and commonalities between cultures 
and indviduals. This is a major direction in moving away from 
conceptualisations of culture as differences and boundaries. 
Multiple identities of the members of a society may not 
perfectly overlap, or be shared. It means that in the set of 
multiple identities, each individual will be characterised by 
differences as well as commonalities with others. Two types of 
conflicts are possible. The first type of conflict is between 
individuals or groups of individuals with more or less similar 
traits because the identity differences that they have fuel or 
cause conflict. But I wish to focus here on the second type of 
identities’ conflict. This second type occurs within an 
individual because certain elements of his multiple identity 
conflict with the other identities he has. It is usual in 
anthropology nowadays to say that identity is not a basic 
indivisible concept, because the multiple identities and the 
relationship between multiple identities of an individual keep 
on changing. This leads to what Sokefeld has described as the 
self7 being confronted with conflicting identities. The Human 
Development Report 2004 did not consider this aspect of the 
conflict between self and cultural identities or any identities 
exhaustively. Without being fixated on the nature of self as a 
Buddhist usually does, it would be fair to say that HDR 2004 
does not talk about conflict and ambiguities within multiple 
identities of an individual. I feel that contradictory identities 
                                                                                                 
 
did not have self-conciousness (Sokefeld 1999:419). He argues for accepting 
self as a universal. 
7 Following Harris, Sokefeld notes that self, person and individuals are used 
in a confusing way but no thorough analytical distinctions have been made 
so far. Harris has suggested that self refers to psychological aspects, 
individuals to biological aspects, and persons to social aspects. Sokefeld 
used self to mean individuals and persons (Harris cited by Sokefeld 
1999:428-429). 
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that rip through a self is the basic challenge, and without 
getting a picture of this we are likely to simplify cultural 
problems as external ones among and between people. How 
strong a self is in negotiating through conflicting identities is 
key to stability and mental coherence. Often, dissolution of a 
culture will negatively affect the personal identities of its 
members. At the same time, being absorbed or integrated 
against ones wish by force of circumstance into another 
culture may spell discontentment. The process of revising or 
switching identities of an individual is often challenging and 
stressful to the self, and can undermine peace of mind 
silently, yet there may be no overt social and cultural conflict. 
The process of change adversely affects especially those who 
cannot negotiate a positive relationship between the self and 
identities. Unlike external masks which we easily wear to suit 
different ‘operas’, the self has to cope with adjusting rapidly 
to many identities and roles to fit oneself into circumstances. 
Sokefeld mentions that this enactment of different identities 
is possible only with reflective sense of the self which he 
defined as “being distinguished from others” ie, awareness of 
what one is doing by enacting one’s identity while being aware 
of being distinct in other identities. In Sokefeld’s study, “the 
consistency of the self rests on the ability to describe one is 
shows an idea in a more or less consistent way” (Sokefeld 
1999: 424). 
Identities conflict within individuals is high when their 
society faces extremely rapid cultural change due to profound 
and sometimes capricious forces of change within which 
individual choice or liberty does not have much of a role. In 
such a situation that is not a gradual evolution, large scale 
shifts in pattern of relationships take place and 
interdependencies may be broken for sometime before a new 
kind is regained. Breakdown in relationship is at the centre of 
suffering and unhappiness. Bonding, or what has been called 
social capital, which is important, is eroded. One’s own 
culture as a context of choice for life plans is weakened. An 
individual faces greater ambiguity in reconciling his or her 
expanding multiple and conflicting identities and that breeds 
identity conflicts within himself, and perhaps also adds to 
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pain and stress and even meaninglessness and unhappiness. 
What I have described is not conflict between cultural groups, 
but within an individual, whose happiness has to be 
ultimately understood in terms of the meaning one feels and 
in terms of relationality with others (Hershock, forthcoming 
book, Chapter 5). When circles of overlapping 
interdependencies between citizens are weak, that is the time 
a state is weak and Gross National Happiness is low. Cultural 
homogeneity in itself does not seem to be a strong 
explanation for unity, power, flourishing or strength of any 
country. 
However, we have to enter a broader discussion on the 
concepts of self because that itself may be culturally varied. 
All concepts of self are views on human nature, both what it 
is and what it should be. Different societies may have 
different empirical as well as idealized views of human nature. 
The concept of self in political liberalism implied in the 
Human Development Report 2004 emphasises the individual 
as an autonomous chooser also of cultural identity and 
personal development. So this particular concept has political 
and economic implications: all institutional frameworks are 
created to fulfil the individual’s own goals and aspirations; 
the individual is responsible for his choice and is socialised to 
be guilty and culpable when he commits transgressions. He is 
responsible for himself and towards himself (Pollis 1965). 
Problems with the concept of self as autonomous chooser 
(agency) arises if there are divergent concepts or views of self 
in different cultures that then makes social and political 
institutions and structures function in a different way.  
For example, groups created by voluntary associations 
presuppose the concept of self as the basic unit of autonomy. 
Such groups are formed to pursue associational interests 
through political processes and are seen as a prerequisite for 
competitive democratic politics. Some have argued that an 
acceptance of the self as autonomous is necessary for 
democratic political system. Others do not think that it is a 
crucial assumption. 
Liberty is based on the assumption of autonomy which is 
defined as conscious choice or reflection. Only if an individual 
Media and Public Culture 
 
 
 
50
has no space to make choices consciously is the person 
without autonomy. This raises a further problem: if a person 
makes a choice due to socialisation, that is unawareness of 
the choice or decision he is making, which may seem to be a 
contradiction in terms, the person may be said to lack 
autonomy in a weak sense. Choices that individuals make are 
framed by current conceptions of what is normal, acceptable, 
and expected, and such frameworks exert powerful influences 
on the degree of autonomy and choice individuals are capable 
of making.  
However, if a certain society’s conception of self lacks any 
construction of an autonomous individual, it creates room for 
alternative group-oriented concepts of self which must be 
distinguished from groups created by individuals who have a 
concept of self as autonomous choosers. 
Group-oriented concepts of self have the image of an 
individual being involuntary and un-autonomous within a 
group, and subordinated to the group. Of course, one can 
understand the notion of a group-oriented identity for human 
beings not as evolutionary organisms but social and political 
beings. The problem that anthropologists face in accepting 
group-oriented concepts of self vis-avis culture is that: “so 
long as we think of humans simply as individuals subjected 
to a collectivity… change of the sort to which human history 
so richly attests becomes curiously distant and difficult to 
comprehend…human sociality evolved through the selective 
advantage conferred upon individuals who possessed 
increasingly powerful sociality… sociality be a trait of 
individuals…The individuals here are conceived solely as part 
of the process of evolutionary change-or-continuity” 
(Carrithers, 1990:191-192). But this view of social evolution 
in terms of sociality is also contested.  
From a Buddhist point of view, the view of self neither 
affirms group dependence nor individualistic independence. It 
is said that self exists conventionally but not in an ultimate 
sense. In the ultimate sense, there is no self and no personal 
identity over time, as we normally think separate entitities 
exist over time (Inada 1988, 1997). Another way to 
understand the lack of separate self is that there is nothing 
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permanent and this can be revealed by focusing on the 
moment-to-moment continuum of existence. Inada writes: 
As such, nothing permanent resides in the continuum, nor 
is anything made permanent by cycle or moment in 
question. The continuum is more like a symmetrical series 
of intersecting and overlapping phenomena. But within 
this context of things, it is so easy to refer to a permanent 
nature of a self that is directing the compounding 
activity… to set the self apart from the activity itself is to 
commit a fallacy of misplaced abstraction or simply beg the 
question. The self, therefore, does not exist in the moment-
to-moment continuum; if reference is made to it at all, 
then it would have to be in terms of what has already 
transpired (Inada 1988:263-264).  
But there is an illusion of the self existing through time, 
when any of the five impermanent aggregates are causally 
related and when such ‘conceptual fiction’ or illusion is 
produced by convenient linguistic designation as ‘self’, 
'person’, ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘he’, etc (Inada 1997: 10-14). If we use the 
postmodernist Derrida’s vocabulary here, we could say that 
the pronouns of this type are signs pointing to entities which 
are not present. But what the absent entity points to is 
another question. Further, in Buddhist moral concepts, the 
notion of lack of self is shown to be consistent with rebirth, to 
comply with the doctrine of karma and cosmic justice.8  
However, what the concept of lack of self means 
normatively in everyday legal and constitutional terms is not 
spelt out anywhere, it seems. All that can be drastically 
concluded here is that if the Buddhist reductionist 
philosophical point of view is to be taken seriously, there no 
person and identity as we postulate in liberalism which claim 
the existence of self. We can further deduce that in our 
                                              
 
8 An eminent Buddhist scholar, Samten Karmay, has questioned whether 
the doctrine of no self actually took root in Tibetan cultural area. He uses the 
widespread belief in srog (life force or vitality) and the rituals associated 
with it to be in tension with doctrine of no self. Although I remember this 
argument he has noted in an article, I have forgotten where I read it and 
therefore I cannot give any reference here. 
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ordinary thinking (that is in conventional sense) of self and 
personal identity, what we construe and apply in law and 
other ordinary affairs of life is incomplete. So an institution 
like law that is based on premise such as conventional sense 
of self (conceptual fiction) must also be conceptual fiction, not 
ultimate justice that is provided only by karma. A glaring 
problem (for me) is that if a virtous activity is performed by a 
person who is a conceptual fiction, how does that accrue 
rewards and punishment. The problem is resolved at the level 
of conception where the ‘original mind’ is said to be inherently 
compassionate, loving, and kind. 
Taking a Buddhist perspective, Hershock (forthcoming 
book Ch.5:11-13) poses the question whether an increase in 
autonomy in the sense of political liberalism results in the 
disparate ends between individuals, or groups and whether 
the differences have to be contained by rule of law. He notes 
the tension between equality and liberty, and between private 
and public spaces. He is of the view, moreover, that pushed to 
its limit, both autonomy and equality can be pursued only if 
both conflicts and contribution to each other are reduced 
through rule of law. What we ideally need is not an 
institutionalized reduction to contribute to each other. His 
argument is that if differences between individuals are non-
existent, for example, through institutional equalization of 
inherently different individuals, logically, there is no way 
individuals can make any contributions to each other. “No 
meaningful change in relational quality is possible in 
ignorance of the karma of presently obtaining patterns of 
interdependence as well as the patterns of denying this 
interdependence in the assertion of either independence or 
dependence” (Hershock forcoming book. Ch. 5:16). Hershock 
sees a danger that “the logic of autonomously exercised 
freedom of choice” could lead “interdependent relationships 
into mere co-existence”. 
Liberty, Choice, and Value Pluralism 
Human Development Report 2004 acknowledges that we have 
multiple identities. But some of these are inherited as 
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members of groups into which we came about without 
choosing to be so, like being born in a certain community and 
to certain religious beliefs, customs, kinship, values, etc. We 
are born diverse but socialised to be alike under dominant 
values. What is emphasised in HDR 2004 is that to continue 
living with such multiple identities still involves making 
choices. Individuals can change certain identities when they 
become aware of other forms of life. What the HDR 2004 
strongly argues is that individuals should be given liberty to 
change their identities and that institutions and processes 
must give an indispensable place to liberty. The argument is 
that continous, conscious, and voluntary identification by an 
individual is necessary with respect to a certain way of life, 
that is libertarian. While voluntary identification may be 
necessary to sustain cultural liberty, whether liberty is valued 
for its own sake or whether liberty is valued for human 
flourishing is not clear. The argument put forward in the HDR 
2004 is that lack of cultural liberty and freedom stunts 
human development and that is by definition diminishment of 
human potential, human flourishing, and human 
development. We need to make a link between human 
flourishing and individually liberty clear. When arguments 
about human flourishing are generally based on indicators of 
economic success and political liberalism, which are further 
based on arrangements like free market and political 
liberalism, it is very difficult to disentangle claims about 
certain institutional flourishing from human flourishing. It is 
equally easy for institutional discussions to occlude long-term 
human happiness issues. 
A discussion of individual liberty and human flourishing 
also leads to a discussion about diversity. With more liberty, 
one may expect more diversity. Diversity may threaten 
solidarity, especially if diversity is developing too fast and is 
perceived as dissent and deterioration. Once again, value 
pluralism would see diversity as a reflection of the existence 
of individual liberty. But we should distinguish here between 
allowing individuals to change their identities consciously by 
their own choice and allowing powerless individuals to be 
changed by profoundly pervasive forces such as marketing 
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and media that seeks to seize onces consciousness and 
attention before one is even conscious and attentive to 
change.  
Rich cultural heritage provides the options and choices 
for us to select life plans. So not having a rich and intact 
culture is a diminishment of choices. A state which cannot 
defend its cultural richness is thus one where the choices of 
its citizens are constrained. According to this line of argument 
advanced by Kymlicka, culture is not valuable for its own 
sake but as a means of, or precondition of, maintaining self-
respect based on one’s own life plans (Kymlica quoted in 
Danley 1991:171). Danley also cites Mill’s arguments for 
happiness. Mill advocated most probably, Danley says, 
cultural diversity instead of cultural conformity as one of the 
two conditions for happiness given than cultural diversity 
allows individuals alternative choices or options for their life 
plans. Self-respect means that any plan in our life is worth 
carrying out. In this context, the argument for cultural 
diversity, and thereby defense of a particular culture, is based 
on cultures as a context of choices. 
Value pluralism’s fundamental point that is shared with 
political liberalism is that there should be minimal conditions 
which should include negative liberty (absence of coercion of 
any kind). The emphasis on liberty and choice, per se, has 
been criticised also by John Gray (1995).9 The central thrust 
of his criticism was based on the fact that making choices is 
not a crucial feature of our life because we are what we are in 
which making choices has not been so critical. We happen to 
be in societies. This means that there is nothing logically self-
evident about choice. So the assumption that choice is crucial 
                                              
 
9 Gray’s criticism was that negative liberty is not necessarily part of value 
pluralism. Galston tried to show that value pluralism and political 
liberalism, as defined by Berlin (1969) view), are consistent. At the heart of 
both, Berlin wrote, was individual liberty, essentially negative liberty: 
liberty not be coerced to do something. Gray attempted to show that Berlin’s 
pluralist stance is not fully consistent with political liberalism (Gray 1995; 
Galston 1999:760).  
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to value pluralism and liberalism is not deduced from human 
nature. As Galston says, “We cannot move directly from the 
inescapability of choice to the valuing of choice that liberalism 
implies, a link Berlin too casually implies” (Galston 
1999:774). 
However, states are not completely free, for obvious 
reasons, from leaving individuals to make their choices and 
chose their values. Often they have to take a range of 
incomparable values and prioritize them in spite of the fact 
that there may not be a completely logical and rational basis 
for rankings among values. They carry out some ordering of 
values on various grounds such as the need for social order, 
law, and solidarity. States often seek limitations on 
individuals’ cultural liberty for the cause of collective success. 
Political institutions often assert that enforcing certain 
cultural traits in their society, and thus restricting liberty, is 
necessary for economic and social successes. Sometimes, and 
only sometimes, these assertions are proven by their ability to 
secure comparatively higher economic growth and better 
material living conditions for their citizens.  
Unity, Diversity, and Homogeneity  
States are in a paradoxical situation with regard to culture. 
On the one hand, culturally oriented states seek cultural 
promotion. Such tendencies manifest in their policies of 
education, media, tourism, etc. that attend to cultural 
heritages or particularisms. On the other hand, in our 
current times of racing towards globalisation and integration, 
most governments promote open-air and open-trade policies 
that tilt the balance radically in favour of cultural diversity 
reduction and even negation. We clearly see evidence of 
cultural implosion in terms of lifestyles, languages, and 
knowledges. These two aspects of policy bundle often lack 
coherence, leading to contradictions. The spread of certain 
digital technology is often cited as a new avenue of promoting 
and preserving cultures, but that is preservation digitally and 
virtually, not really as a mode of actual living.  
Yet as Walzer pointed out, states make the world of 
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common meaning possible (Walzer 1983 cited in Bader 1995: 
218) and each state does endeavour to do that. And it would 
seem that no state can be completely free from the task of 
creating a certain degree of common identity and meaning, 
although the task is probably becoming far more challenging 
in a globalizing world where identities continue to meld and 
be challenged.  
It is an old, comforting belief that if we live in a space 
where there is “common meaning, shared language, common 
cognitive and normative frameworks” (Bader 1995: 218) we 
can be closely affiliated as citizens or members, and bring 
collective consciousness as a distinct community. Common 
meaning means mainstreaming historical memories to 
national narratives, and implies development of something 
over and above local histories and memories. Hence, local 
history and identities are not necessarily preserved to the 
same degree as national identity and history. 10  
The belief in cultural unification and homogeneity is 
probably pursued partly for national unity, and unity is 
pursued for the security, strength, and independence of 
decision-making. However, we must begin discussion on this 
issue by pointing out that complete sovereignity of a nation is 
itself a dramatic myth. The unity and powers of all sovereign 
nations’ are in fact not absolute in any sense. A state shares 
its powers internally through subsidiarity, federalism, 
decentralisation, and so forth. At the same time, a state 
shares its powers externally with supranational institutions. 
States have joined movements towards formation of regional 
associations and communities that diminishes their 
monopoly of legislations and decisions. Both internal and 
external power-sharing arrangements are further constrained 
by international laws. These external limitations on a state’s 
sovereignty have resulted in what is called domestic 
democracy deficit (Habermas, 2003). The divisibility of a 
state’s powers, both internally and externally, even in a 
                                              
 
10 The belief in common meaning led many states to unavoidable dilemmas 
in multi-cultural and multi-lingual units within a state. 
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culturally homogeneous nation means that its culture is 
really not the basis of strength and unity, as a state’s power 
cannot be mobilised solely on the basis of a relationship 
between the state and its culturally homogenous people. 
Just as a state’s sovereignty (power to make decisions) is 
not unitary (singular), the notion of citizenship in a state does 
not coincide completely with the set of traits of a 
multicultural nation. In a culturally diverse nation, 
citizenship cannot be bound to any culture. In an 
increasingly globalising world, citizenship may not even be 
bound to a nation. In the EU, for example, some elements of 
citizenship, for example freedom of mobility and work is 
granted on an EU-wide basis. 
Habermas ((1992) cited in Bader 1995: 223) has argued 
that national identity in terms of culture should be divorced 
from citizenship because citizenship since the French 
Revolution has been mainly a democratic concept. In a 
Habermasian democracy, there is no particular history, no 
particular culture, perhaps only a common language and a 
political community (Bader 1995, 232). However, Bader has 
raised a question as to how individuals can be motivated to 
democracy when they are divorced from their cultural 
identities.  
If we use certain criteria like military, economic, or 
political power, a state containing homogenous culture has 
not necessarily been stronger or more successful than a 
heterogeneous state and vice versa. Even if a state is 
culturally homogenous, that in and by itself does not 
guarantee that there will be complete harmony, equality, and 
unity amongst its people. We can conceive of conditions 
under which exclusion thrives under class system, caste 
system, gender discrimination and domination, even in a 
culturally homogeneous nation. As in every community, or 
even in a family some of the times, a homogenous nation is 
also often marked by conflicts and dissension. 
Human Development Report 2004 mentions that cultural 
hybridisation has contributed to rejuvenation, and 
conversely, homogeneity and purity may often lead not to 
organic growth but ossification. Of course, how much of 
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hybridisation and crossing strains has to take place has to be 
judged carefully by taking account of the relative penetrative 
power of each culture. Both the speed and scale of change 
need to be considered. Too fast a cultural change can bring 
dislocation in the society where parts of it do not meld but 
become antagonistic to each other. Sudden change at a mass 
level breaks down bonding and cohesion, unity which are 
valueable asset to build a community. If it is swept away by 
sudden cultural change, it can unleash a disintegrating effect.  
Cultures and Globalization 
From a developmental point of view, one is interested in the 
importance of globalisation as a process promoting 
international equality. In The Lexus and the Olive Tree, its 
author, Friedman (1999), argued that globalization is a given, 
reifying it almost to a natural force. However, if globalisation 
were to benefit citizens everywhere, it would have to 
contribute towards global equality of income or distribution of 
resources, greater environmental preservation, and peace.  
Bader (1995) has argued that we happen to be citizens of 
a particular nation entirely due to accidents of birth and 
descent that then determines what our country has to offer as 
life chances, privileges, and rights of a citizen. If life chances 
for individuals are so vastly unequal simply because of 
accidents of birth, and individuals are not responsible for 
their births or choice of country, in a sense they have moral 
claim to globally equal resource distribution. And if 
immigration does contribute to global equality, it seems that 
it is a means to a better or just world. Adverse immigration 
conditions indicate a lack of attention to global collective 
welfare (Bader 1995:214-216). 
As we know, movement of capital is more free than 
labour. Immigration is at the end spurred on by inequality 
and poverty. However, almost all governments today, for fear 
of stress and strain of introducing foreigners into the body of 
polity and economy, opt for investments and trade as ways of 
addressing international iniquity. The conditions for entry of 
immigrants, refugess, and workers are tough enough to 
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discourage everyone except the clever and the well-off. Yet a 
century or so ago, in colonial times, movement of people was 
very prevalent from some of todays northern countries to the 
lands of the indigenous people who have became minorities in 
their own homelands. Restrictive immigration policies today 
are mainly defended and legitimated on grounds of cultural 
self-determination and protection (Bader 1995, 213), and by 
fear that immigrants will flood the host countries because 
both the size and growth of population are smaller in today’s 
host countries. The necessity for tight entry policy is 
particularly strong and obvious for countries with small 
population like that of Bhutan.  
Kenneth Waltz (1999:700) has noted that “the main 
difference in international politics now and earlier is not 
found in the increased interdependence of states but in their 
growing inequality.” He was talking about “distribution of 
capability across states”, but it is also true of income equality. 
The measures of interdependence of states he uses is trade 
and capital flows as a percentage of GNP. With respect to the 
mobility of labor, Waltz mentions that we have reached only 
about 1910 level, although the rate of migration is rising. In 
spite of a tendency for rising mobility of labor, legal and 
physical doors for immigration to developed countries are 
getting relatively tighter and narrower. Human Development 
Report 2004 advocates liberalisation of immigration on the 
grounds that it brings similar gains to the host economy as 
lowering trade barriers does (p. 102) and suggests rather 
optimistically that anti-immigration is like “fighting against 
the tide of globalisation”. In dealing with immigrants, the past 
practices of differentialism and assimilation are argued to be 
outmoded and the report argues in favour of 
multiculturalism. Multiculturalism supports value of diversity 
within a society, and it does not exclude participation of any 
members of society in civic and socio-political sphere because 
of someone’s cultural identity. 
Regardless of lower mobility of labour from south to 
north, the spread of commercial interests backed by 
corporations as part of globalization has threatened 
indigenous peoples and their knowledge and cultural 
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properties. Michael Brown (1998) has explored the 
implication of cultural appropriations of intellectual property 
rights. Benedict Kingsbury (1998) has inquired into the 
concept of indigenous peoples in international law. Territories 
of indigenous people are being mined and their resources 
extracted with no just compensation. Indigenous knowledge 
associated, for example, with crop genetic resources and 
herbal medicines are stolen, patented, and trademarked. 
Human Development Report (p. 86) mentions that “A March 
2000 study concluded that 7,000 patents had been granted 
for unauthorized use of traditional knowledge, or the 
misappropriation of medicinal plants.”  
What are indigenous knowledge, cultural productions, 
and cultural properties, that may include intangible things 
and to which such legal instruments can be plausibly 
applied, are the nub of the problem. There is a belief, 
regardless of the viability, that copyright and intellectual 
property rights are the legal instruments to control cultural 
properties. Copyrights and patents are supposed to protect 
private ideas and creations. Such laws give the private 
persons or legal persons compensation for their work when 
their works enter the so-called public domain. Application of 
patents and trademarks would prevent unauthorised used of 
such cultural properties, but only for a period of time, after 
which they can become part of public domain. Contrary to 
expectations of some cultural groups, patents and trademark 
laws as they are today will not give permanent right of 
cultural ownership (Brown 1998;204) as they have finite 
terms: patents for 17 years and copyrights for author’s 
lifetime plus 50 years (Brown 1998:196). But there are two 
problems that need further attending. First the concept of 
intellectual property, which is wedded to private property and 
solitary invention, sits uneasily with cultural forms which are 
collective patrimonies and dynamic. Moreover, current 
intellectual property laws cannot cope if the definition of 
cultural properties is so wide as to include both ideas and 
their expressions within a cultural heritage. Brown’s example 
about musical performance within certain cultures which 
may not have any written musical scores demonstrates the 
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complexity it presents to intellectual property laws. He thinks, 
however, that radical change to intellectual property laws is 
an unworkable solution to preservation and control of 
cultural properties and suggests more options like “creative 
licensing partnerships between native communities and 
corporate interests…”, provided of course the corporations are 
in the first place sympathetic to the conservation of cultures. 
Second, political liberalism based on individuals as 
autonomous choosers are ambivalent about group-based 
rights “which do not fit into the structure of liberal thought” 
(Kingsbury 1998; 426), except as some kind of civil society. 
Indigenous people are defined provisionally by three criteria: 
consisting of nondominance within the area, cultural affinity 
with the area, and historical continuity until colonisation 
(Kingsbury, 1998:454). It is rare to have bounded or distinct 
areas occupied by specific native minorities as in America and 
Australia, which we can call indigeneous people (Comments 
by Descol in Brown 1998:209). In non-colonized nations, 
there seems to be rarely any concept of indigenous and non-
indigenous people, a terms which has roots in the colonial 
period. But defining who indigenous people are seems to be a 
problem beyond liberal thinkers alone. Several states in Asia11 
have rejected recognition of indigenous collective rights, 
because it seems that recognising more than one peoples in 
their states and accepting indigenous legal and political 
systems with ‘indigenous people’ will have radical 
consequences.  
Diversity Vs Human Development Priorities 
As far as democratic or political liberalist states are 
concerned, they have no set goals, because the basic principle 
is that individuals are free to do what they value and what 
                                              
 
11 Kingsbury (1998, 433-436) mentions that Asia, India and China, for 
example, have rejected the concept of indigenous peoples. Both China and 
India seem to have argued that indigenous peoples are those “peoples who 
came first, (or at least earlier than those who are now dominant)... and it is 
impossible to say who came first”. 
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gives them meaning. The state does not have a collective end 
to pursue except to maintain, broadly stated, the democratic 
principles of equality and liberty. The end is up to the 
individuals; the means must be democratic. 
The contention of UNESCO’s (1995) report Our Creative 
Diversity has been that the neglect of culture, which it defined 
(using the old definition of culture) as inclusives of all 
domains of life including economy, in development discourse 
and practice has led to some degree of failure of development 
(Wright 1998:11). The old of idea of culture in the UNESCO 
report is that of a bounded culture, which led it to 
recommend cultural diversity on the basis of ethnic groups or 
a ‘people’. But Wright criticises this standpoint of the report 
and shows that any definition of concept of culture is not a 
‘given’ and its definition is a ‘construction’ made by definers 
and is susceptible to the “political process of contestation 
over the power to define key concepts...” (Wright 1998:14).  
Hershock writes that:  
All suffering is pivots on the experience of 
meaninglessness. We all know that it is possible not just to 
endure, but to learn and grow from even the most extreme 
hardships. Very often, it is in the most dire straits that we 
learn how compassionate we can be, how appreciative of 
every small nuance in our relationships with others. In yet, 
each of us also knows precisely what it is to feel that 
though we are still going through the motions of living, our 
lives have already ended. This feeling of profound impasse, 
their sense that there is no point in going on, no direction 
promising an exciting and meaningful continuation of our 
story, announces not the factual nature of our situation 
but the extreme poverty of our dramatic resources–our 
blocked or depleted capacity for meaningfully revising our 
situation and appreciating our unlimited intimacy with all 
things (Hershock 2000:23). 
From a Buddhist point of view, many scholars have 
shown that human rights are consistent with Buddhist 
teachings while others have seen the limitations of human 
rights as a culturally and historically contingent idea. 
Hershock (2000) points out that human rights as a purely 
conceptual entity considers all human beings as equal and 
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independent, and thus in defining ourselves in such 
universalistic or generic terms as right bearers, devoid of our 
cultural and social connections, we ignore all the 
particularities that define us. One of the consequences of 
such a view of human beings, he sees, is that rights are about 
“mediating between claims of groups or states and those of 
individuals” (p. 17). In any case, the central plank of his 
Buddhist discourse on rights begins with the Buddhist notion 
of all things—individuals, cultures, environments, etc—as 
having no essential or fixed natures in and by themselves. For 
example, human beings exist neither inside nor outside the 
five khandas: “a human being is irreducibly relational”, 
“arising as a quality of relationship between ‘beings’ and ‘the 
environment’” (p.18). His structure of a moral universe is 
based on karmic value and intention, where everything 
(meaning, the ideas, events, experiences, actions, objects) is 
interdependent and relational, as part of the evolving 
meaning of our lives. We contribute to meanings in others’ 
lives as and while they contribute to ours in what he calls 
“the creative continuation of a shared narrative”. Given that 
Buddhism is concerned with the conditions of pain, Hershock 
points out that “both suffering and its resolution must be 
understood as native in nature—as a function of the 
interruptions and healings of our dramatic or meaningful 
interrelationships… that is, from a Buddhist perspective, 
suffering arises only when our narrative moment, the 
meaningful flow of our interdependence, is radically diverted, 
interrupted, or blocked” (p. 22). If I understand Hershock 
correctly, our interactions can be either based on rich direct 
personal interrelationships or organisationally or 
institutionally mediated interrelationships. When the 
organisationally mediated inter-relationships are on the 
ascendant, naturally free personal relationships are displaced 
by control and atomised by security institutional regulations. 
He mentions human rights as organisationally mediated 
relationships whereby different domains of rights are secured. 
His contention is that the focus on regulatory institutions like 
human rights steers individuals away from meaningful 
interdependence because institutions designed for control at 
Media and Public Culture 
 
 
 
64
the end are not conducive to “adding value to our already 
meaningful pattern of interdependence. Human rights, then, 
will to insure… the conservation and development of our 
resources for dramatic virtuosity.” 
Hershock (2000) has suitably charted out a fuller 
evaluation of human rights in a new original light of subtle 
and rich interpretations of old Buddhist concepts of 
interdependence, no essential natures, karmic values, and 
the Eightfold Path. If I simplify it to a bare thread, that cannot 
do justice to it, his interpretations of Eigthfold Path stress 
freedom from ideological, institutional, and technological 
dominations that diminish our capacity to freely and 
spontaneously direct our attention to realise more meaningful 
and responsive relationships with one another (p. 29). 
Unity between Human Rights and Cultural Liberty 
There is a serious attempt to reconcile and harmonise human 
rights, cultural identities, competitive politics of liberal 
democracy, biased WTO-blessed international trade, and 
investment regimes. Throughout, the report resonates with 
the message that an individual must be free, and must have 
the right, to choose, change, and revise various elements of 
his multiple cultural identities if he wishes to. The entire 
discussion is suffused with human rights as free choice, and 
free choice as cultural liberty. The core ideal of liberal 
democracy is its fabric. Free choice of identities is argued as 
being central to human rights and human development. All 
institutional arrangements, local or global, therefore must 
allow for individuals to exercise a free choice in cultural 
matters to be consistent with human rights. Human rights 
trumps over or subordinates cultural liberty, in the book. 
Actually, at one point, the report goes so far as to say that 
cultural diversity is not an end in itself but an outcome of 
freedom and choices (HDR 2004, p. 89), and that human 
rights is also one of the five family members of universal or 
global ethics. According to the report, global culture equals 
universal ethics of human rights and responsibilities. 
Is there a consonance between human rights and 
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cultural liberty? One would like it to be there. If we believe 
that an ethnic nation or an ethnic people “have 
comprehensive rights in its own cultural productions and 
ideas” (Brown 1998, 195), these may include their own 
notions of right and wrong. If we limit ourselves to cultural 
diversity and moral relativity, it is hard to reconcile human 
rights with cultural liberty of individuals within a single 
culture where such human rights may be violated as part of 
their culture. And if we believe also that there is no evidence 
for cultures to be ranked as better and worse (HDR 2004, p. 
90), we have no ground to advance global ethics of human 
rights into any particular cultural group. On the other hand, 
acceptance of human rights as a universal standard that 
should arbitrate or evaluate intercultural diversity in the 
political domain, overtly calls on all ethnic nations and 
peoples to converge on the liberal political state, which is 
exactly why it is seen as controversial by some cultural 
entities.  
We are aware that people everywhere do not see it as a 
universal standard, because every standard is a standard 
from within a particular worldview (Cleveland cited in Brown 
1998: 207). Individual choice and rights cannot be 
universalised through power relationships, or by force on 
others. We can say that tolerance is necessary. But we can 
also ask as to whose tolerance we are talking about. I 
personally think that human rights are the bench mark for all 
societies. But cautionarily, all are aware that human rights, 
especially in its specifications of economics and politics (as 
part of the second generation rights), are rejected by 
particularists.  
Multi-religion 
Secularisation was often seen as a dependant variable, 
dependent directly on modernization (Chaves 2004:765). In 
these days of science, individualism, and globalisation, it is 
certainly a widespread assumption that religion has a 
marginal role in politics and society. For a long time, 
academics who subscribed to modernisation theory believed 
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that modernisation will lead to lesser role of religion in 
politics. Numerous prominent political events driven by 
religion have forced a revaluation. Likewise, secularization,12 
which predicted the diminishment of religion as a social force, 
has also drawn doubts. Following Dobbelaere, Chaves (1994) 
characterised secularization as: domains gaining autonomy 
from religious institutions whereby religion is reduced to one 
sphere among many, the conformity of religious institutions 
with the secular framework, and the decline of religious 
practices among individuals. Chaves, in keeping with his 
definitional focus on authority, redefined all three dimensions 
of secularisation to a reduction in the scope of control by 
religious authority in the institutional sphere, the 
organisational level, and individual level. He made religious 
authority an object of secularisation rather than religion itself 
(Chaves 1994:757-770). 
The persistent role of religion has to do with several 
factors, but in political terms, it would seem that the religious 
organisations which already exist lend to political 
mobilisation, mass media, and public influence (Fox 
2004:57). His explanation for the rise of the religious 
resurgency is that “… in many ways, religious 
fundamentalism is an organized criticism and rejection of 
modernity. Fundamentalists reject the replacement of 
religious morality and explanations for the world in which we 
live with scientific and rational explanations and moral 
systems” (Medelsohn, 1993; Tehranian, 1993 cited in Fox 
2004:58). According to Fox, at present, religion is being used 
                                              
 
12 Chaves (1994) defines secularization as declining scope of religious 
authority. He distinguished his definition from that of secularization as 
declining religion. Chaves says that actual or potential use of physical 
violence is key to political authority. Likewise, he points out that “An 
authority structure is religious as long as its claims on obedience are 
legitimated by some reference to the supernatural referent… Secularization 
as declining religious authority, then, will referred to the declining influence 
of social structures whose legitimation rests on a reference to the 
supernatural ” (Chaves 1994:756). 
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politically for (a) providing legitimacy to governments or 
resistance to certain governments and (b) justification for 
terrorism or war. The religious conflicts are difficult to resolve 
because articles of faith are not negotiable.  
The presence of religious conflicts suggests that religion 
is an important factor in modernity: it will not disappear. 
Even if the conflicts are not religious in nature, Fox says that 
religion may influence the conflict when the two conflicting 
groups belong to different groups. Studying findings of 
conflict studies for the 1990s only, he suggests that “religious 
conflicts are a significant minority of conflict” contrary to 
Huntington’s predictions if civilizations are equated roughly 
with religions. Jonathan Fox (2004), using state failure data 
set for the period 1950 to 1996, has studied religious conflict 
for that period. His study suggests that non-religious conflicts 
are much more numerous than religious conflicts in the 
period since 1960 (Fox 2004:64). However, the number of 
religious conflicts has remained steady and has not declined. 
Among the religious conflicts, the most common are shown by 
Fox to be between two Christian groups, followed by two 
Muslim groups. But the number of inter-religious conflicts 
are highest between Muslims and other religious groups (Fox 
2004:67-69). 
Only four countries have state religion and they all 
happen to be Buddhist. All other countries, theoretically, are 
said to be secular. The secular nature of a state is considered 
universal whereas religion is considered particular and local. 
But whatever the exact nature of the state, the important 
thing is that no religion is going out of the public space, and 
it cannot go out of the public space in any democracy.  
Secularism, by which is meant the separation of politics 
and religion, is supposed to provide public scope for rightful 
difference in multilingual societies. From a Buddhist point of 
view, Hershock writes that: 
 The Buddha did not argue for or against any particular 
form of government... he consistently and powerfully 
advocated committed revision of the meaning of political 
and social relationships, focusing in particular on the 
dramatically significant interplay of values and intention… 
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Buddhist teachings aimed at opening up an entirely new 
kind of space—a new dimension. Taking up the Middle 
Path was not aimed at coming to rest at a point of perfect 
balance among competing and thus mutually limiting 
viewpoints, but at abandoning the very terms and 
conditional circumstances of the competition itself 
(Hershock forthcoming book: Ch. 5:3-4).  
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